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SEEING THE LIGHT: IGNORING COLLATERAL
ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE PUBLIC WHEN
ENFORCING SERVITUDES
...No restriction determined to be of such actual benefit shall be
enforced or declared to be enforceable, except in appropriate
cases by awardof money damages, if... (5) enforcement, except by
award of money damages, is for any other reason inequitable or
not in the public interest.'
In the words of provision (5)... we take judicial notice of the exceedingly high property tax rates current in the city of Boston and
the beneficial effect on the tax base2 of the petitioners'planto construct a multimillion dollarproject.
There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishingeconomic
developmentfrom otherpublicpurposes that we have recognized.3
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974 in Blakeley v. Gorin,4 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court abrogated significant non-fee property rights in the Commonwealth
by refusing to enforce specifically servitudes known as Commonwealth
Restrictions in Boston's Back Bay neighborhood. The Commonwealth
Restrictions at issue in Blakeley provided certain property owners with a
vested interest in maintaining the flow of ambient light and air through the
alleyway that runs between and behind the parcels of land subject to the

1 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 30 (2005).

Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 913 (Mass. 1974).
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
4 Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 913 (Mass. 1974).
' Id. at 913-14.
2

3
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restrictions. 6 In holding that property owners could build a sky-bridge that
would necessarily limit their neighbors' access to ambient air and light, the
court explained that the sky-bridge would increase the tax base for the city
of Boston and thus the intrusion on non-fee private property rights was
justified . The legal vehicle that allowed the Court to reduce petitioners'
building's access to ambient light and air was Massachusetts General Law
Chapter 184 § 30.8 The question whether the Supreme Judicial Court in
Blakely v. Gorin facilitated an unconstitutional taking under the United
States Constitution became moot when the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision - legitimizing a private party taking for economic
9
development as a sound "public use" - in Kelo v. City of New London.
The national reception of Justice Stevens' Kelo decision has been
hostile, and the response to it could be characterized as a property rights
defense movement. " I contend that the Massachusetts General Court
should participate in this movement not only by passing legislation to protect fee interests as other states have done, but also by passing legislation
to protect non-fee interests such as the Commonwealth Restrictions at issue in Blakeley.11 Amending Massachusetts General Law c. 184 § 30 to
preclude the taking of non-fee property interests for collateral economic
benefits, I believe, would return the statute to its original purpose by2relegating matters collateral to use and occupancy of land to non-factors.'
This note proceeds in the following manner: First, I will investigate

6

Id. at 906.

See Blakeley, 313 N.E.2d at 914. Chief Justice Hennessy wrote that the outcome of
the case was not dispositive for future, different controversies in the Back Bay regarding
other parcels also subject to the Commonwealth Restrictions. Id. at 913-14. Prominent in
Chief Justice Hennessey's reasoning was the fact that petitioners, developers of the RitzCarlton Hotel on Arlington Street, would be able to garner more tax revenues for Boston
once respondents' building's ambient light and air could be obstructed by a sky-bridge. Id.
at 913-14.
8 See id. at 913; see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES
AND PRACTICES 476-82 (3d ed. 2002). Singer must have found the statute and case to be
symbiotic enough to place them in immediate succession in order to be mutually explanatory. Id. at 476-84.
9 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (stating economic growth is indistinguishable from other
valid public purposes in eminent domain jurisprudence); see also infra note 139 (setting
forth current proposal to the Massachusetts Constitution to provide new state protections);
cf infra note 135 (suggesting Massachusetts constitutional private property rights are no
more protective than the Federal Constitution).
10 See infra notes 117-142 and accompanying text (cataloging the forms the national
response to Kelo that have taken place since the decision).
See infra notes 143-151 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits such an
amendment would bring).
12 See infra notes 19-83 and accompanying text (explaining the original purpose of the
statute and the corpus of its jurisprudence).
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and report the legislative history and purpose of G.L. c. 184 § 30.13 Second, an explication of G.L. c. 184 § 30 is warranted. In particular, I will
stress that the statute, except for the amorphous "public interest" clause,
explicitly regulates or has been held to regulate either the equitable conduct of parties or some type of tangible, three-dimensional use or occupancy of land. 14 Third, I will investigate how the statute was used in
Blakeley v. Gorin, and I will discuss Justice Quirico's dissent., 5 Fourth, I
will discuss Kelo with an eye toward explaining two points: how Kelo relied on precedent to arrive at a holding that is counter to the plain text of
the Fifth Amendment and, therefore, how Justice Quirico's Constitutional
dissent was rendered moot thereby. 16 Fifth, Kelo has spawned a property
rights defense movement with popular, judicial, and legislative responses,
and I will argue that any response to it in Massachusetts needs to legislative. 17 Last, I will argue that my proposal to amend the statute will
broaden the protection of significant property interests while also serving
the original purpose of the statute. 18
II. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL
LAW CHAPTER 184 § 30
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 184 § 30 was passed into law
by the Massachusetts General Court on May 10, 1961 as part of "An Act
To Protect Land Titles From Uncertain And Obsolete Restrictions And To
Provide Proceedings In Equity Thereto."' 19 The aforementioned act was not
passed in order to facilitate the state's exercise of eminent domain power
through condemnation. 20
The act simply subjects all parcels in the Commonwealth with re13 See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (explaining why the statute was passed
into the General Laws).
14 See infra notes 25-83 and accompanying text (arguing the statute's jurisprudence is
concerned with land or equity).
15 See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text (explaining what was at stake in Blakeley v. Gorin).

16 See infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text (arguing that Justice Quirico's constitutional dissent in Blakeley v. Gorin is moot after Kelo).
17 See infra notes 117-142 and accompanying text (cataloging the various forms the

reaction to Kelo has taken nationally).
18 See infra notes 142-151 and accompanying text (arguing such an amendment would
accomplish both tasks).

19See 1961 Mass. Acts 448. The other statutes passed as part of this act are Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 184 §§ 26-29 (2005). Id.; see also EDWARD C. MENDLER,
MASSACHUSETTS CONVEYANCERS' HANDBOOK WITH FORMS § 10:1 (2005) (referencing the
involvement of the conveyancing bar of Massachusetts in legislative real estate reform).
20 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (contending the act tends to serve the
purposes named in its title).
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strictions that run with the land to the provisions of the statute. 2 1 The act
further provides that restrictions on such parcels are not enforceable unless
recorded, and the act requires that any such restriction must be re-recorded
thirty years after its inception and every twenty years after that in order to
be enforceable. 22 G.L. c. 184 § 30 provides for equity proceedings to regulate, limit or eliminate uncertain or obsolete restrictions. 23 Given the express and implied purpose of the legislation of which Chapter 184 § 30
was an integral piece, it is doubtful that the court's decision in Blakely v.
Gorin served the statute well.24
III. EXPLICATING MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAW
CHAPTER 184 § 30

A. The "actualand substantialbenefit" requirement
No restriction shall in any proceeding be enforced or declared to be
enforceable, whether or not the time for recording a notice or extension under section twenty-seven or twenty-eight has occurred,
or such a notice or extension has been recorded, unless it is determined that the restriction is at the time of the proceeding of actual
and substantial benefit to a person claiming rights of enforcement.25
The first part of the statute's initial sentence makes explicit that recording requirements of restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes and
the possibility of their enforcement are entirely separate inquiries in the
Commonwealth.26 For our present purposes the latter half of the statute's
first sentence, the "unless" clause, is more crucial as it serves as a gateway
for my contention that the statute aims to regulate the three-dimensional
use of land. 27 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals and the Supreme Judi21
22

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 30 (2005).
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, §§ 27-28 (2005); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184,

§ 29 (2005) (setting out the recording procedures for both recorded and registered land in
the Commonwealth).
23 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 30 (2005).
24 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (explaining the purposes intended to
be served by the 1961 Act do not include condemnation).
25 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, §30 (2005).
26 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 30 (2005); see also MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, §§
27-29 (2005).
27 Cf infra notes 28-83 and accompanying text (arguing the vast majority of the statute's jurisprudence is concerned only with land).
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cial Court have announced that "actual and substantial benefits" contemplated under the statute cannot be collateral to the enforcing party's use of
land at issue.28
A wide variety of actual and substantial benefits, however, have
been recognized as legitimate in the case law so long as the benefit concerns the three-dimensional use or occupation of land. 29 For example, in
Connaughton v. Payne a restriction limiting the number of single family
dwellings the plaintiff could build on her property was upheld.3 1 At trial,
experts offered testimony that "[further] development of plaintiffs property would upset the species diversity and populations of both plant and
animal life on the defendants' property. 3 2 The restriction did provide an
actual and substantial benefit to the defendants by protecting the ecosystem on their land they had sought to nurture and protect.33
Aesthetic and economic considerations have also been taken into
account by fact-finders when determining whether a restriction provides an
actual and substantial benefit to a party seeking its enforcement. 34 In Atwood v. Walter35 a development's restriction in Barnstable, in keeping with
traditional Cape Cod building practices, required all roofs in the development to be constructed with wooden shingles or shakes. 36 The unique architectural character of the development neighborhood, Jacob's Farm Village, was worth protecting, and the defendant was benefited by the restriction as it served to preserve a unique and aesthetically pleasing set of
homes.37 Similarly, in Kline v. Shearwater Association, Inc.3 8 a development's restrictions aimed toward creating a uniform scheme of development that protected the natural topography of the area. 39 The trial judge's
finding that the covenants at issue thus provided "an actual and substantial
28

See infra notes 29-56 and accompanying text (explaining that the appellate cases

have held that the benefits concern the use and occupancy of land).
29 See infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text (setting out the myriad ways in which
an actual and substantial benefit can affect use and occupancy of land).
30 779 N.E.2d 683 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
31 See id. at 686 (deferring to trial judge's finding that a protected ecosystem on the
defendants' property constituted an actual and substantial benefit).
32 Id. at 686.
33 See id. at 686; see also id. at 684 (setting forth a list of plants and animals on the
defendants' property that would be disturbed by further development).
34 See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text (explaining the appellate cases that
have so held).
" 714 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
36 See Atwood v. Walter, 714 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (setting forth the
upshot of the covenant at issue with regard to building materials).
37 See id. at 369 (noting the benefits of architectural and aesthetic uniformity to the
developer brought about by restrictive covenants in Jacob's Farm Village).
38 830 N.E.2d 235 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
39 See Kline v. Shearwater Assoc. Inc., 830 N.E.2d 235, 242 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)
(explaining how the restrictions aimed to preserve the natural topography and view).
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value" was upheld by the Appeals Court.4 °
Restrictions conducive to pleasing aesthetics have been held to
provide actual and substantial benefits even when they have the additional
effect of reducing economic competition within a certain area.4' In Gulf
Oil Corporationv. Fall River Housing Authority a redevelopment authority divided one area into two parcels.42 In one of the areas service stations
were not allowed to be constructed if they had been permitted in the
other. 43 This had the effect of limiting gas station competition in the former area. 44 The restriction was upheld because it provided a benefit of a
mutually helpful, orderly development for the area of Fall River at issue. 45
Restrictive covenants that have the effect and purpose of limiting
business competition have also been upheld.46 In Exit 1 Properties Limited Partnershipv. Mobil Oil Corp. mutually restrictive covenants between
two parcels, once owned by a common grantor, had the effect of allowing
sales of gasoline only on one of the parcels and the sale of food only on the
other.4 7 Thus, by promoting the restaurant business conducted on the latter
parcel, the covenant provided an actual and substantial benefit to its
48
owner.
The above cases demonstrate actual and substantial benefits within
the meaning of the statute take various forms, but in all circumstances the
covenant aids use or occupation of land somehow. 49 In Garlandv. Rosenshein50 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a covenant barring development on a parcel's adjoining land was not of actual and substantial benefit
where the grantor-defendant owned no other land in the same town. 5' The
See id. (holding that preserving the natural topography did provide an actual and
substantial benefit to parcel owners in the development).
40

41 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 306 N.E.2d 257, 262 (Mass. 1974)

(upholding the validity of a restriction despite its effects on local commerce).
42 See id. at 259 (explaining that the effect of the redevelopment plan was to partition a
neighborhood in two).
3 See id.
44 See id. at 262 (noting economic benefits to owner of service station already estab-

lished in the more restricted area).
45 See id. (holding that an orderly plan of development constitutes an actual and substantial benefit despite economic effects).
46 See Exit 1 Properties Ltd. P'ship v. Mobil Oil Corp., 692 N.E.2d 115, 117 (Mass.
Ap. Ct. 1998) (upholding restrictive covenants limiting competition).
See id. at 116 (explaining the effects on competition the restrictive covenants had on
each of the subject parcels).
48 See id. at 117 (holding that a restaurant owner did receive an actual and substantial
benefit from a restriction on neighboring land proscribing the sale of food on that neighboring land by a service station).
49 See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text (explaining how the appellate courts

allow for actual and substantial benefits to take a number of different forms).
50 649 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1995).
51 See Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756, 757 (Mass. 1995) (explaining that the

defendant had no land that could be benefited by the restriction).
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covenant did not help the defendant use or occupy his own land anywhere.52 The defendant, moreover, could not claim that the price of releasing the covenant - what Justice Nolan coined as53its "hold-up price" - provided him with an actual and substantial benefit.
Actual and substantial benefits, therefore, are spatial and aid enforcing parties with the use, occupancy and enjoyment of their land.54
Actual and substantial benefits are never collateral to the spatial use of
land.55 In the interests it tries to protect, scuttle or regulate,
therefore, the
56
used.
is
land
subject
the
how
with
concerned
only
is
statute
B. Proving actual and substantialbenefits
There shall be a presumption that no restriction shall be of such actual and substantial benefit except in cases of gifts or devises for
public, charitable or religious purposes, if any part of the subject
land lies within a city or town having a population greater than one
hundred thousand persons unless (1) such restriction at the time it
was imposed is not more burdensome as to requirements for lot
size, density, building height, set back, or other yard dimensions
than such requirements established by restriction or restrictions applicable to the land of the persons for whose benefit rights of enforcement are claimed; or (2) such restriction is part of a common
scheme applicable to four or more parcels of contiguous except for
any intervening streets or ways to land of the grantor or other
premises purported to be benefited thereby; or (3) unless such restriction is in favor of contiguous land of the grantor.57
The enforcing party's burden of proving an actual and substantial
benefit is case specific depending on the population size of the town or
municipality where the subject land is located: if the affected parcels are in
a town or city with a population under 100,000 persons impliedly there is
no presumption concerning the existence of an actual and substantial benefit, but if the subject land is in a larger municipality the enforcing party
must overcome the presumption that the servitude does not provide him an
52

See id.

See id. at 758 (holding the benefit of a restriction cannot be the prospect of releasing
that restriction for consideration).
54 See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text (explaining the case law on actual and
substantial benefits requires some benefit to use and occupancy of land).
51 See id.
53

56

See id.

57

MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 184, §30 (2005).
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actual and substantial benefit in the use of his land.58
There are many other cases in which the enforcing party has no
presumptive burden to overcome. In latter cases, for instance, if the restriction is part of a gift or a devise for religious, charitable, or public purposes the presumption against the party seeking enforcement does not exist.5 9 In latter cases furthermore, the presumption against the enforcing
party also does not exist if the restriction when it was imposed or created
was not more burdensome to the servient estate(s) than similar restriction
placed on the dominant estate. 6 °
Similarly, if the restriction is part of a common scheme for four or
more contiguous parcels divided only by streets, roads, or rights of way the
same presumption does not come into play. 61 For example, in Lipton Professional Soccer, Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding
Association,62 a covenant restricting events in a stadium continued to be
valid as it was part of a common scheme to develop a commercial real
estate locus, despite the fact that the original owner of the dominant estate
was no longer thereby benefited.63 A common scheme, moreover, does
not require that all affected parcels are affected uniformly, but that a harmonious use of the whole area is contemplated.64 Last, like in situations of
a common scheme, there is no presumptive burden for the enforcing party
to overcome where the restrictions benefit contiguous parcels of the grantor.65

C. Eliminatingspecific enforcement of legitimate servitudes
No restriction determined to be of such benefit shall be enforced or
declared to be enforceable, except in appropriate cases by money
damages, if (1) changes in the character of the properties affected
or their neighborhood, in available construction materials or tech58

See id.

9 See id.
60 See id.

See id.
395 N.E.2d 470 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
63 See Lipton Prof I Soccer, Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding
Ass'n, Inc., 395 N.E.2d 470, 475-76 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (noting the parcel was subject to
a common scheme against the original parties' successors in interest); see also Guillette v.
Daly Dry Wall, 325 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Mass. 1975) (holding deeds with a common grantor's
restrictions placed successors on constructive notice).
64 See Gulf Oil Corp., 306 N.E.2d at 261 (stating that uniformity of parcels' treatment is
not required of a valid common scheme); see also Harrod v. Rigelhaupt, 298 N.E.2d 872,
877-78 (Mass. App Ct. 1973) (finding that a common grantor's effort at private zoning
through restrictions placed subject land under the aegis of a common scheme).
65 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, §30 (2005).
61
62
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niques, in access, services or facilities, in applicable public controls of land use or construction, or in any other conditions or circumstances, reduce materially the need for the restriction or the
likelihood of the restriction accomplishing its original purposes or
render it obsolete or inequitable to enforce except by award of
money damages, or (2) conduct of persons from time to time entitled to enforce the restriction has rendered it inequitable to enforce
except by award of money damages, or (3) in case of a common
scheme the land of the person claiming rights of enforcement is for
any reason no longer subject to the restriction or the parcel against
which rights of enforcement are claimed is not in a group of parcels still subject to the restriction and appropriate for accomplishment of its purposes, or (4) continuation of the restriction on the
parcel against which enforcement is claimed or on parcels remaining in a common scheme with it or subject to like restrictions
would impede reasonable use of land for purposes for which it is
most suitable, and would tend to impair the growth of the
neighborhood or municipality in a manner inconsistent with the
public interest or to contribute to deterioration of properties or to
result in decadent or substandard areas or blighted open areas, or
(5) enforcement, except by award of money damages, is for any
other reason inequitable or not in the public interest. 66
This provision of the statute operates as an escape clause of sorts by
limiting the remedy for restrictions that provide actual and substantial
benefits to enforcing parties solely to money damages in myriad situations. 6 1 I contend that like the statute's requirement of an actual and substantial benefit and the provisions setting forth the situations in which an
enforcing party must overcome a presumptive burden, the provisions of
the statute that limit an enforcing party's remedy to money damages are
concerned with the use and occupancy of land or an inquiry into parties'
equitable conduct.68 Justice Hennessey's inquiry into the collateral public
benefits which would result from terminating the enforcement of the
Commonwealth Restrictions at issue in Blakeley
v. Gorin,
therefore, was a
t
69
mistaken anomaly within the statute's jurisprudence.
ch. 184, § 30 (2005).
See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (explaining how the inquiry remains
fixed on spatial uses and occupancy of land).
68 See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text (explaining the spatial nature of actual
66

MASS. GEN. LAWS

67

and substantial benefits); see also infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (explaining
remedies are affected by equitable conduct or spatial use of land).
69 Cf Blakeley, 313 N.E.2d at 913 (noting the collateral effects abrogating viable restrictions would produce for Boston).
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The first situation in which the statute mandates limiting remedies
solely to money damages concerns changes in building practices, materials
or parcels' neighborhoods.7v For example, one matter at issue in Atwood v.
Walter was whether cedar wood roofing materials were obsolete given
their high expense and low durability in comparison to asphalt shingling
materials. 7' Expense alone does not make a material or building technique
obsolete.7 2 Changes in the Back Bay in Blakeley v. Gorin rendered obsolete restrictions prohibiting mercantile and commercial land utilization, but
urban encroachment did not render obsolete restrictive covenants that preserved ambient light and air but actually made them more valuable.73
The third and fourth situations named in the statute also examine
how subject parcels' use or occupancy is affected, not collateral matters or
benefits. 74 For example, enforcing parties who receive an actual and substantial benefit from a restriction will have their remedy curtailed solely to
money damages if their own use or occupancy of their land is no longer
subject to a common scheme that once restricted all nearby parcels.7 5 In
addition, use of land is of paramount importance if a restriction retards the
reasonable use of land or tends to deteriorate a neighborhood7 6
Given that specific enforcement of restrictions is equitable in nature, the statute - in subsections (2) and (5) quoted above - mandates that a
restriction that does provide an actual and substantial benefit will not be
specifically enforced if the equities of a controversy do not favor an enforcing party once his use of his own land has been characterized. 7 For
example, in Atwood v. Walter the roofing material restriction, although it
did provide an actual and substantial benefit, was not specifically enforced. 8 Specific enforcement was not appropriate given that the defendant had unclean hands: he had breached a corresponding promise by installing an asphalt shingle roof on his own residence in Jacob's Farm Village.7 9 Laches may also estopp an enforcing party, but the inquiry still
See MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 184, § 30 (2005).
71 See Atwood, 714 N.E.2d at 371 (deferring to trial judge's finding that expense alone
70

did not render wood shingle roofs obsolete).
72 See id.
71 See Blakeley, 313 N.E.2d at 911-12 (explaining the difference between obsolescence
of one restriction and the viability of the other in light of neighborhood changes).
74 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 30 (2005).
75 See id.

76 See Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243, 252 (Mass. 1979) (barring
specific enforcement of restriction of commercial land use if proof of restriction's unreasonableness or its obstruction of the public interest is shown).
77 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 30 (2005); see also infra notes 78-80 and accompaning text (investigating equity's role in the enforcing the statute).
See Atwood, 714 N.E.2d at 371.
79 See id. (estopping a developer - through the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" or
breach of corresponding promise - from receiving injunctive relief to prevent the defen-
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remains limited to how subject parcels are being used or occupied.80
Subsection (5) quoted above is the only part of the statute that does
not concern itself solely with the use or occupancy of land.81 In Blakeley
v. Gorin Chief Justice Hennessey allowed matters collateral to the use and
occupancy of land to trump property rights and execute a private condemnation.82 A legislative response is required
to block this possibility and
83
purposes.
its
on
focused
statute
the
keep
IV. CHAPTER 184 § 30 IN BLAKELEY V. GORIN
The Commonwealth Restrictions at issue in Blakeley v. Gorin date
back to the middle of the 19th century when the City of Boston decided to
fill in the tidal flats area where the Back Bay neighborhood now sits, as
drainage problems were creating a public nuisance. 84 Commencing in
1857 the city as common grantor sold lots to private grantees that were all
subject to the same or substantially similar restrictions as part of a comprehensive land use scheme for the entire neighborhood. 85 The petitioners
in Blakeley v. Gorin owned 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 Commonwealth Avenue,
which at the time was a vacant lot, as well as 13-15 Arlington Street abutting 1, 3, and 5 Newbury Street, all today the TAJ-Boston Hotel site.86
The respondents who were seeking specific enforcement of the Commonwealth Restrictions were the owners of an apartment building located at
12-14 Commonwealth
Avenue, which was immediately west of the peti87
tioners' vacant lot.

All the parcels involved in the litigation were subject to the Com-

dants from installing an asphalt shingle roof on their home when the developer had done so
himself on his own home, unless the developer replaced his residence's roof with a wood
shingle roof).
Compare Exit I Properties,692 N.E.2d at 119 (holding laches inapplicable where
restaurant owner allowed burdened parcel to have vending machines on its premises), with
Weinstein v. Tariff, 255 N.E.2d 595, 596 (Mass. 1970) (holding laches applicable where
plaintiffs silently allowed defendant's predecessor in interest to build steps in violation of a
restriction in deed for an unreasonable amount of time before attempting to have restriction
enforced).
81 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 30 (2005); ef supra notes 29-80 and accompanying
text (arguing the vast majority of jurisprudence concerning the statute is spatial and not
concerned with collateral benefits to the public).
82 See Blakeley, 313 N.E.2d at 913 (holding specific enforcement of covenant would
result in a lower tax base for Boston, thus not in the public interest).
83 Cf infra notes 117-139 and accompanying text (explaining why a legislative response is the only appropriate response to this problem post-Kelo).
84 See Blakeley, 313 N.E.2d at 905.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87

id.
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monwealth Restrictions.8 8 In particular, both parties' parcels were subject
to the following restrictive covenant: "[t]hat a passageway sixteen feet
wide, is to be laid out in the rear of the premises, the same to be filled in
by the Commonwealth, and to be kept open and maintainedby the abutters
in common..." (emphasis added). 89 Leaving the passageway open allowed
for the flow of ambient light and air for the buildings whose backs90 abutted
the passageway, Public Alley No. 437, including the respondents'.
Litigation developed because the petitioners proposed to build a
sky-bridge between its existing hotel, located at the comer of Arlington
and Newbury Streets, to a building they planned to construct on the vacant
lot located at 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 Commonwealth Avenue. 9' The bridge as
planned - sheathed as a finished building would be - would begin thirteen
feet above Public Alley No. 437 and extend upwards for twelve stories.92
The bridge/building would have the effect of blocking and cutting off the
flow of ambient light and air to thirty-two apartments on the back side of
respondents' apartment building whose primary source of light and air was
one window opening to the alley.93
Chief Justice Hennessy of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that the restriction would not be specifically enforced as it
would impede a development project that would result in a higher tax base
for the City of Boston, a collateral matter to the actual use and/or occupancy of the subject parcels. 94 In dissent, Justice Quirico argued that violating the restriction amounted to a taking of respondents' property rights
in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article X of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 95 The impetus of
Justice Quirico's dissent was elegantly simple: "...the total absence of any
public use or public purpose to support giving the petitioners the right to
take away the respondent's property rights embodied in the [Commonwealth] restrictions.

96

Over this dissent, Chief Justice Hennessey wrote

that a taking had not occurred, but simply that a change in the covenant's
enforcement was effectuated by operation of the statute. 97 Chief Justice
88 Id. at 906.
89 Id.

90 Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 906 (Mass. 1974).
91 Id.

Id.
93 Id.
94 See id.
at 913. Chief Justice Hennessey simply concludes that "balancing the equi92

ties" demands the result he reaches. Id.
95 See Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 917-18 (Mass. 1974) (Quirico, J., dissenting)
(stating there exists no public use for this taking and the Supreme Judicial Court's holding
places in private individuals' hands the state power of eminent domain).
96 Id.at 920.
97 Id.at 907 (majority opinion).

SEEING THE LIGHT

2007]

Hennessey also wrote that even if a taking had occurred by operation of
the statute, it would not be unconstitutional because valid public purposes
would be served. 98
V. CURRENT FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE:
KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
inter alia that "...private property [shall not be taken] for public use, without just compensation." 99 Despite the two strict rules embodied in that
section of the Fifth Amendment, however, the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld a taking that would facilitate a private developer's
plans for other privately held land.100 Justice Stevens coalesced three concurrent developments in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in his strained
and tortured Kelo opinion: (1) the public use clause of the Fifth Amendment can be satisfied when takings further some public purpose; (2) economic development is one such valid public purpose; and (3) when a polity
exercises condemnation pursuant to state legislative acts it is afforded
great deference.' 10
Public use necessarily implies that members of the public, its
agents, or the public as a whole will somehow actually utilize property in
some physical sense. 10 2 Such a public employment of property, however,
is no longer required in order to satisfy the public use clause, and the plain
98 See id. at 909, 913 (stating the public purposes include promoting the proper use of
land and increasing real estate marketability and Boston's tax base).
99

U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

1oo See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005) (holding a private
plan of development satisfied the public use clause given that economic redevelopment is a
valid public use).
101See infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text (explaining how the public use
clause is now satisfied without public employment of property); infra notes 108-112 and
accompanying text (tracing the Court's approval of economic development as a valid public
purpose); infra notes 113-117 and accompanying text (noting deference to state decisions
concerning public purposes). See generally Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo
v. City of New London: An Argument For Banning Economic Development Takings, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491 (2006); Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New London-Wrongly Decided and a Missed OpportunityFor PrincipledLine Drawing With Respect to
Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REv. 17 (2006); Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and
Reweighing Eminent Domain's PoliticalPhilosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FoREST L. REv.
237 (2006); Brent Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose: The
Supreme Court Stretches The Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 GONZ. L.
REv. 81 (2005-2006); James L. Radda, Kelo v. City of New London: "Economic Development" as a "Public Use" Under the Fifth Amendment, 28 Wyo. LAWYER 14 (Oct. 2005).
102See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 507 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating the public use
clause requires public "employment" of property by either the government or the citizenry
as a whole).
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meaning of public use has been under attack in the Supreme Court since
1896.103 A pair of mining cases decided in 1896 and 1906 noted the "inadequacy" of the public use test. 0 4 Ten years after Strickley, the Court in
Mt. Vernon-Woodbury Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power
Co.'l 5 established that public use is an inadequate test in Fifth Amendment
takings jurisprudence. 10 6 Public use jurisprudence, relied upon by the
Court in Kelo, has essentially written
the public use test out of Fifth
07
Amendment takings jurisprudence. 1
Economic development or re-vitalization is a valid public purpose
which satisfies the public use clause of the Fifth Amendment, according to
Kelo and the jurisprudence it relied upon. 10 8 Berman v. Parker1 9 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. MidkifJ"10 established that taking private real
estate to further economic development does not violate the Fifth Amendment."' Economic development has also been declared a valid public
purpose, thus satisfying the public use test, in non real estate takings litigation.'12

Last, the Court in Kelo also continued in elevating legislative decisions on what constitutes a local or state level public purpose. 1 3 The
Court was quite. impressed with the fact that New London was acting pursuant to a Connecticut statute that authorized economic development tak103See id. at 479-80 (tracing the inception of the public purpose test version of the pub-

lic use clause).
104 See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896) (upholding a
taking to facilitate an ore-transporting zip-line over land the mining company did not own);
see also Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (noting that
in exceptional circumstances the public welfare requires concessions by individuals that are
usually within the realm of private contract).
105 240
106

U.S. 30 (1916).

See id. at 32 (explaining how in the context of modem hydro-electric power plants

the public use test proves inadequate).
7 See Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014-15 (1984) (holding use by the
general public is not necessary to satisfy the public use clause). "This Court, however, has
rejected the notion that a use is public only if the property taken is put to use for the general
public." Id.
108 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-82 (2005) (discussing precedents amenable to the Court's
decision).
1o9 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
110 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
111See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480, 481-82. In Berman, the land was taken in order to redevelop a blighted area of Washington, D.C. Id. In Midkiff, the Court upheld a taking that
aimed to disrupt a harmful land oligopoly in the residential real estate market. Id.
112 See Ruckelhaus, 467 U.S. at 986 (taking of trade secrets to make pesticide market
more competitive was a valid public purpose satisfying the public use clause).
113 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482-83 (noting that federalism inspired "great respect" owed to
state legislatures and courts also extends to takings power exercised by state because local
needs are best determined locally); see also Hairston v. Danville & Western R. Co., 208
U.S. 598, 606-07 (1908) (noting that local needs are best taken into account by State courts
when they review questions about what is or is not a private use).
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ings before moving on to a holding allowing a taking of one person's private property and the subsequent transfer of it to another.' 14 Kelo coalesced three strands of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence to render a
decision that flies in the face of the plain text of the Fifth Amendment: a
citizen's private property was taken from her and given to another person
because collateral economic benefits might have accrued from the transfer
of the land. 1 5 Justice Quirico's dissent in Blakeley v. Gorin, therefore, no
longer has any force vis-A-vis the Federal Constitution.16
VI. POST-KELO PROPERTY RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS
Whatever one's political affiliations or proclivities in Constitutional
interpretation, it is undeniable that the national reaction to Justice Stevens'
Kelo decision has originated from many quarters. 117 There have been reactions from the populace, the United States Congress, academics urging
judicial re-assessment of state law or appreciation of state constitutions,
and state legislatures."i 8 Below I will briefly discuss the first three in order
to make clear that the reaction to Kelo is substantial and that my proposal
to amend G.L. c. 184 § 30 can only fit in the last category of pro-property
rights reactions to Kelo. 1 9 To conclude this section I will report the vastness of state legislative proposals promulgated or proposed to counter
Kelo, including Massachusetts'
pending legislation, and argue my proposal
1 20
is in line with those.
Although popular opinion cannot directly change the law, it is the
vital impetus of the common life of any polity that purports to be a constitutional republic with democratically elected legislators and executives,
and the populace's voice has been raised in reaction to Kelo.'21 The public's reaction has been as extreme as threatening death or as docile as regis114

See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482-83 (following Hairston as to state courts and reading into

Hairston the same deference to state legislatures).
115 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also notes 106-114 and accompanying text (tracing
the constituent elements of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence upon which Justice Stevens
relied in Kelo).
116 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (reporting Justice Quirico's dissent in
Blakeley v. Gorin); cf supra notes 102-112 and accompanying text (economic development
is a valid public purpose which satisfies the public use clause).
117 See infra notes 118-138 and accompanying text (cataloging the forms of the nation's
resonse to Kelo).
8 See id.

119 See infra notes 121-136 and accompanying text (explaining why Massachusetts is
legally situated to mount only a legislative response).
120 See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text (naming the states that are currently
legislating some type of response).
121See infra note 122 and accompanying text (noting the variety of types of public
reactions to Kelo).
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tering disapproval of the decision in public opinions polls, but whatever
one's assessment of the reaction it must be recognized as actual and widespread. 22 Public reaction to cases like Kelo and Blakeley v. Gorin must,
therefore, be an integral part of any political solution to them despite its
lack of direct rehabilitative force.
The Congress of the United States has also reacted negatively to
the Kelo decision, but similarly to public opinion, the actions of the United
States Congress have only persuasive force to any property rights defense
movement interested in rectifying state law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In fact, the House of Representatives passed House Resolution
340 condemning the decision and supporting the dissenting opinions.' 23 In
addition, the 2006 appropriations bill was amended in order to prohibit
any
124
federal funds from being used to enforce the judgment of the case.
Congressional reaction to Kelo, however, has not only been limited
to retrospective condemnation of the Supreme Court, but also has been
aimed toward prospectively limiting the impact of the decision.1 25 Douglas W. Dahl II has identified three areas in which Congress has attempted
to ameliorate Kelo's effects: proposing Constitutional amendments; proposals to circumscribe public use; and restraining federal spending. 26 For
example, House Joint Resolution 60 proposes a Constitutional Amendment
that bans takings that would transfer ownership or control over property
from one person to another private person. 27 Representative of the second
category are Senate Bill 1313 and House Bill 3083, which both circumscribe public use as not including economic development. 28 The last
category of Congressional response proposes that federal funds be withdrawn from state or 129
local governments that use eminent domain for economic development.
122 See Timothy J. Dowling, How To Think About Kelo After the Shouting Stops, 38
URB. LAW. 191 (2006) (noting that death threats have been sent to city officials in New
London); see also Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. City of New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and
Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201 (2006) (noting that in public opinion polls Kelo is anathema to popular views).
123 See Douglas W. Dahl, I1,Comment, Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, Are
PrivateProperty Rights Really in Danger?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 443, 457 (2005) (stating House disapproval embodied in the resolution was passed the day after the decision);
see also Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent
Domain, Federalism, and CongressionalPowers, 32 J. LEGIS. 165, 172 (2006) (reporting
the House's challenge to the opinion on Constitutional grounds).
124 See Bell, supra note 123, at 172 (mentioning the rider passed to accomplish that
A2 See infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text (delineating how Congress is trying
to limit the effect of Kelo).
126 See Dahl, supra note 123, at 458-62.
127 See id. at 458.
128 See id. at 459.
129 See id. at 460-61.
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Some in academic circles have sought refuge from Kelo in the particular protections afforded to some under their state's constitutional principles. 30 For example, Texas and Michigan are two states whose constitutions and case law would not allow the type of taking that occurred in
Kelo 1 3 1 To illustrate, Timothy Sandefur argues that Texas takings jurisprudence does not allow economic development takings, and that Texas
courts have rarely strayed from this principle which was derived from the
founding of the Republic of Texas, kept alive at its first state constitutional
convention, and purposely reiterated in its second constitutional convention. 32 As Brett D. Liles and Joshua E. Baker have pointed out, the
Michigan Supreme Court in Wayne County v. Hathcock133 overruled a
previous Michigan case that had allowed economic development takings
grounds to afford residents of Michigan simion strict state Constitutional
34
lar protections. 1

Residents of Massachusetts, unfortunately, simply do not have the
same types of state constitutional protections afforded to those in Texas or
Michigan. 135 State jurisprudence concerning urban redevelopment cases
have upheld takings that effectuate the transfer of land from one private
person to 36
another that are incidental to public purposes, such as slum
clearance. 1

By far, the most widespread and effective reaction to Kelo has
come from state legislative bodies.137 Although states' legislatures' responses to Kelo have taken various approaches to reigning the case in, a
majority of the states have or are considering passing appropriate legislation: Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
130 See infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text (explaining how economic development takings are barred in Texas and Michigan).
131 See

generally Timothy Sandefur, Don't Mess With Property Rights In Texas: How

The State Constitution Protects Property Owners In The Wake of Kelo, 41 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 227 (2006); Joshua E. Baker, Note, Quieting The Clang: Hathcock As A
Model For The State-BasedProtectionof Property Which Kelo Demands, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 351 (2005); Brett D. Liles, Note, Reconsidering Poletown: In The Wake of
Kelo, States Should Move To Restore Private Property Rights, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 369
(2006).
132 See Sandefur, supra note 131, at 252.
133 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
134 See Baker, supra note 131, at 378 (reporting that economic development is not a
valid rationale for takings in Michigan); Liles, supra note 131, at 384 (reporting the same).
135 See Jeffrey B. Mullan, My Land Is Your Land: Re-examining Massachusetts Eminent
Domain Law In Light OfKelo v. City of New London, 50 BOSTON BAR J. 18, 19 (May/June
2006) (reporting that the exercise of eminent domain that benefits private parties is wellestablished in Massachusetts).
136 See id.
137 See Donald E. Sanders & Patricia Pattison, The Aftermath of Kelo, 34 REAL EST. L.
J. 157, 168-70 (2005) (cataloging both the Congressional and State legislative countermeasures to Kelo).
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Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.13 8 Massachusetts is among the group of
states that have proposed both a constitutional amendment
and a ban on
39
1
blight.
of
cases
in
except
takings
development
economic
There has been a deep and widespread reaction to Kelo from a
number of quarters, and any response to it that would benefit Massachusetts residents needs to be legislative. 140 The proposed pieces of legislation before the General Court are an appropriate response. 14 1 My proposal
to rectify G.L. c. 184 § 30 complements them because it seeks also to protect private property interests from being taken for the benefit of another
private person because of resulting collateral economic benefits to the public. 142

138

Id. at 170.

139 See

id; see also House Bill No. 4606, 184th Leg. (Mass. 2006),
www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/184/ht04pdf/ht04606.pdf (last visited March 3, 2007)
(setting forth the text of the proposal to amend the constitution of the Commonwealth)
[hereinafter House Bill No. 4606]; House Bill No. 4605, 184th Leg. (Mass. 2006),
www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/184/htO4pdf/htO4605.pdf (last visited March 3, 2007)
(setting forth the statutory proposal) [hereinafter House Bill No. 4605].
House Bill No. 4606 provides in part:
Article of Amendment: Except in cases where the elimination or prevention
of the development or spread of a substandard, decadent or blighted open
area is provided by law, the taking of lands or interests therein by eminent
domain for the sole purpose of economic development is hereby declared
not to be a public use of the commonwealth under the first paragraph of Article X of Part the First of the Constitution.
Id.
Section 1 of House Bill No. 4605 provides in part:
The General Court hereby finds and declares that the taking of private property by
right of eminent domain for the sole purpose of economic development is contrary to the public policy of the com'ionwealth and does not
satisfy the requirement of a "public use" under Article X of Part the First of
the Constitution (Declaration of Rights), except to the extent such takings are
authorized for the elimination or prevention of the development or spread of
a substandard, decadent, or blighted open area under chapters 121 A, 121 B
and 121 C of the General Laws.
Id.
140 See supra notes 117-139 and accompanying text (discussing the nation-wide reaction
to Kelo).
141See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text (noting Massachusetts' particular
reaction's pending legislation).
142 See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text (explaining how amending Massachusetts General Law Chapter 184, § 30 is appropriate, post-Kelo).
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VII. CONCLUDING PROPOSAL

Blakeley v. Gorin serves as a case study for what is wrong with
G.L. c. 184 § 30.143 The two most grievous renderings of the statute are
that 1) it serves to facilitate condemnation of property interests - something it was never intended to do or 2) it allows courts to take into account
collateral benefits to the public that do not concern use or occupancy of
land. 44 I contend that an amendment to the statute that prohibits courts
from looking to collateral economic benefits that do not concern use or
occupancy of land will participate in the post-Kelo movement and bring
145
the public interest clause of the statute in line with its original purpose.
First, Chief Justice Hennessey's alternative argument in Blakeley v.
Gorin - that even if a taking were facilitated by the statute it was not unconstitutional because it furthered the public purpose of higher tax bases
for Boston - in the most crucial way anticipated the Kelo decision: economic health of the area was the public purpose. 146 There is a movement
afoot that seeks to eradicate this type of taking when other property interests are at stake. 147 My proposal would complement that movement by
attempting to protect servitude property interests from being taken when
the public purpose involves collateral economic benefit to the greater pub14 8
lic.
Second, Chief Justice Hennessey's reasoning in Blakeley v. Gorin
was an anomaly within the corpus of G.L. c. 184 § 30's jurisprudence.149 It
is the only case within that jurisprudence where collateral benefits to third
parties that do not concern use of occupancy of land were given any
weight whatsoever. 5 ° My proposal to amend the statute, therefore, not
only participates in the post-Kelo appreciation and defense5 of property, it
also returns the statute to its original purpose and function.' '
143See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 19-83 and accompanying text (explaining the statute's purpose and
jurisprudence).
See infra notes 146-151 and accompanying text (claiming benefits to such a proposal).
14P See supra note 98 and accompanying text (reporting Justice Hennessey's claim that
increasing the tax base is a public purpose).
147 See supra notes 117-142 and accompanying text (reporting the post-Kelo defense of
property).
48 Cf supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting the abrogation of the Commonwealth Restrictions in Blakeley v. Gorin for collateral economic benefits to the public).
149See supra notes 25-82 and accompanying text (claiming and arguing the jurisprudence of the statute is almost exclusively devoted to inquiries concerning the use and occupancg of land).

15o Id.

151See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (explaining why the statute was
passed into the General Laws).
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Much has been made nationally of the recent Kelo decision, but
Massachusetts property owners should also keep Blakeley's dangers in
mind. The Massachusetts legislature has a unique opportunity to use the
national momentum to protect fee interests and also to pass legislation that
will protect significant non-fee interests in Massachusetts.
Michael S. Schneider

